This chapter covers the following subjects:
• Describe the concept of a public key infrastructure: Discusses the fundamentals of public key infrastructure.
• Configure, verify, and troubleshoot a basic Cisco IOS Software Certificate Server: Learn how to configure a Certificate Server on a Cisco IOS Software–based router.
• Enroll a Cisco IOS Software VPN router into a PKI and troubleshoot the enrollment process: Covers enrolling a VPN router into a public key infrastructure. It also covers troubleshooting problems with that process.
• Configure and verify the integration of a Cisco IOS Software VPN router with supporting PKI entities: Leads you through configuring a VPN router to authenticate ISAKMP peers using PKI.
IPsec Virtual Private Networks (VPN) can be implemented with several different authentication methods. Public key infrastructure (PKI) provides a highly scalable authentication solution for VPNs.
The “Do I Know This Already?” quiz helps you decide whether you really need to read the entire chapter. If you already intend to read the entire chapter, you do not necessarily need to answer these questions now.
The nine-question quiz, derived from the major sections in the “Foundation Topics” portion of this chapter, helps you determine how to spend your limited study time.
Table 16-1 outlines the major topics discussed in this chapter and the “Do I Know This Already?” quiz questions that correspond to those topics.
Table 16-1. “Do I Know This Already?” Foundation Topics Section-to-Question Mapping

The goal of self-assessment is to gauge your mastery of the topics in this chapter. If you do not know the answer to a question or are only partially sure of the answer, you should mark this question wrong for purposes of the self-assessment. Giving yourself credit for an answer that you correctly guess skews your self-assessment results and might provide you with a false sense of security.
1. What is the one central trusted introducer called?
a. Identity certificate
b. RSA algorithm
d. X.500 distinguished name
e. None of these answers are correct.
2. A list of all certificates that are no longer valid is called which of the following?
a. Old certificate list
b. Revoked Certificate List
c. Certificate Revocation List (CRL)
d. Invalid Certificate Authority List
e. Expired Certificate List
3. Which of the following is something that can cause issues in a PKI system?
a. Synchronized time
b. Variable time
c. Unsynchronized time
d. Manually configured time
e. None of these answers are correct.
4. The SCEP interface on a Cisco IOS Software Certificate Server is enabled with what command?
a. ip scep server
b. set scep server enable
c. ip http server
d. crypto server scep
e. None of these answers are correct.
5. To integrate PKI-based authentication with site-to-site VPNs, which protocol must be configured to use PKI-based authentication?
a. IKE
b. GRE
c. AAA
d. RSA
e. VPN
6. PKI clients can enroll to the Cisco IOS Software Certificate Server using which two types of enrollment?
a. SCEP
b. IKE
c. TACACS
d. Manual
7. Which storage method is considered the most secure for storing a Cisco IOS Software PKI client’s private key?
a. USB Smart Token
b. NVRAM in clear text
c. Encrypted on an external USB storage
d. Encrypted on NVRAM
e. Private section in NVRAM
8. What information does the client send to the CA during the enrollment process?
a. IP address
b. Client’s private key
c. Client’s public key
d. Name of device
9. By default, what will the IKE process on Cisco IOS Software routers accept if signed by its locally defined trustpoint CA?
a. A client IP address
b. Client’s private key
c. Any valid certificate
d. A new CRL
The answers to the “Do I Know This Already?” quiz are found in Appendix A. The suggested choices for your next step are as follows:
• 7 or less overall score: Read the entire chapter. This includes the “Foundation Topics” and the “Exam Preparation” sections.
• 8 or 9 overall score: If you want more review on these topics, skip to the “Exam Preparation” section. Otherwise, move on to Chapter 17, “Deploying DMVPNs.”
Using public key infrastructure (PKI) provides a scalable solution for site-to-site IPsec VPNs. This chapter provides a description of public key infrastructure and covers planning a PKI integration with Cisco IOS Software site-to-site IPsec VPNs. After this, implementing a basic Cisco IOS Software Certificate Server, enrolling a Cisco IOS Software VPN router into a PKI, and integrating a Cisco IOS Software VPN router with supporting PKI entities will be covered as well.
IPsec VPNs can use public key infrastructure to provide a scalable solution for peer authentication. Digital signatures are commonly used by many authentication protocols for traffic running over untrusted or public networks.
Public key cryptography, which usually uses the Rivest, Shamir, and Adelman (RSA) algorithm, uses pairs of keys called the public key and private key for its encryption and digital signature processes. Both of these activities call for an exchange of public keys between the two entities that want to communicate. For digital signature verification, the verifying party must securely obtain the public key of the party that signed traffic with its private key. Obtaining the public key must be done in a secure manner to maintain the authenticity and integrity of the public key.
Public key exchanges must be performed between each pair of entities that need to communicate. This means that for n parties to communicate with each other, the number of public key exchanges is a function of n multiplied by n. This shows that manual public key exchanges are not scalable and should only be considered for the very smallest of implementations.
One way to ensure that the public key exchange is done securely is to exchange the public keys over the untrusted transport in the clear, but to verify them in another out-of-band channel that is considered secure. This could mean reading the public key and/or its fingerprint (hash digest) back over the telephone to the sending party for verification. This method is very tedious, prone to mistakes, and not scalable.
Pretty Good Privacy (PGP), one of the best-known attempts to overcome the scaling problem, is an email and file encryption system based on public key cryptography. PGP uses a concept call trusted introducing, in which existing point-to-point key exchanges can be tied together to help with the public key distribution issue.
Figure 16-1 shows an example in which users A, B, and C all have their own public/private key pair and the trusted introducer is user B. (User B is not labeled in the diagram.) Also,
• Users A and B have securely exchanged their public keys using the previously mentioned manual method of out-of-band verification.
• Users B and C have also securely exchanged their public keys using manual verification.
Figure 16-1. Showing Where the Trusted Introducer Is (User B)

With this setup, users A and B (and users B and C) can securely exchange messages in their respective point-to-point relationships. They have two ways to use PKI to secure messages. In one way, they can digitally sign the messages for authenticity and integrity with their own private key as the sender and verify the signature with the corresponding private key as the receiver. The other way is that they can encrypt the message with the public key of the other party, and the receiver will decrypt the message with its own private key.
This scenario provides two point-to-point secure channels. One channel is between users A and B and the other is between users B and C. The question is: Can this be used to connect users A and C in their own point-to-point trust relationship?

The answer is yes. User B will act as a trusted introducer because he has a secure channel with both user A and user C. When user A and user C need to exchange their public keys securely, they can do it with the assistance of user B, if that user is considered trustworthy to perform this introduction. The steps are as follows:
Step 1: User B digitally signs the public key of user A (which it has locally) and sends it to user C.
Step 2: User C can then verify the signature of user B (because it has the public key of user B) and can consider the public key of user A to be authentic.
Step 3: User B digitally signs the public key of user C (which it has locally) and sends it to user A.
Step 4: User A can then verify the signature of user B (because it has the public key of user B) and consider the public key of user C to be authentic.
This method involves RSA public keys being signed with RSA private keys to provide a method of exchanging public keys in a secure manner. Users A and C can now communicate securely.
This principle of trust can be used in certain topologies and is fairly scalable. The downside to this approach is that users can make mistakes and jeopardize other hosts because of the trusting nature of this approach.
The evolution of this procedure that has a much higher scalability and provides much better manageability is to use a trusted third-party cryptographic protocol.
The use of a trusted third-party protocol with public key cryptography is also based on digitally signing public keys, but extends the idea to the use of a single trusted introducer. This involves there being only one central trusted introducer (called the certificate authority [CA]) that signs all the public keys in its administrative domain (this means servers, users, routers, and so on). In addition, all entities in this administrative domain trust the CA. This means that all entities have the public key of the CA, which they use to verify messages from the CA.
Figure 16-2 depicts a situation in which each entity has its own pair of asymmetric cryptographic keys, a public and private key. User A and C want to communicate securely. The trusted introducer (the CA is the trusted third party) is trusted by all users.
All entities trust the CA by virtue of having obtained its public key in a secure manner. This process of obtaining the public key of the certificate authority in a secure manner (such as out-of-band or manually reading over the telephone) is called authenticating the CA.
To participate in the PKI system, all end users must enroll with the CA, which involves a process in which they submit their public key and their name to the CA. Figure 16-2 shows a trusted introducer (this time, the certificate authority) and the users that trust it.
Figure 16-2. Trusted Introducer: Certificate Authority

After a user submits his public key and name to the CA, the CA verifies the identity and public key of the enrolling user. If it finds the user’s information (public key and name) to be authentic, the CA then digitally signs the submitted information with its private key.
This creates an identity certificate for the submitter. An identity certificate is a piece of information that binds a PKI member’s name to its public key and puts it into a standard format. The identity certificates are returned to the users bound together with the signature of the CA. The users then install them and can use them until they either retire or are revoked.
Now that each entity has the public key of the certificate authority along with its own identity certificate, which has been signed by the certificate authority, the identity can verify any data that is signed by the CA.
The entities can now act independently of the CA and establish point-to-point communications with each other by exchanging information about themselves by using the CA-authenticated identity certificate.
This means that end users can now mutually exchange certificates over untrusted public networks and use the digital signature of the certificate authority as the trust mechanism for the public key exchange. Note that this is possible because each entity can prove the authenticity and integrity of the CA’s signature because each identity has the certificate authority’s public key. Essentially, the user’s identity certificate is trusted because it is bound to the Certificate Server’s digital signature (private key). The Certificate Server’s digital signature is trusted and can be verified because each entity obtained the CA’s public key securely.
This exchange of identity certificates does not prove the identity of the sender. Certificates simply provide a level of assurance that a specific name is connected to a specific public key. Identity can be proven through the use of an authentication protocol that can use certificates (which contain public keys) in certain procedures that prove an entity’s possession of the private key that corresponds to that public key.
The public key of the CA is also distributed in the form of a certificate issued by the CA itself. This is also called a self-signed CA certificate, because the signer and holder of the certificate are the same entity.
The identity certificate is a document that binds together an entity’s name and its public key and is signed by the certificate authority so that every other end-user entity will be able to verify it (by virtue of having the CA’s public key already).
Note that certificates are not secret information and it is not required to encrypt them. They are protected by a digital signature that proves their authenticity and integrity.
The typical data found in an X.509 identity certificate is as follows:
• Name of the certificate holder
• Public key of the holder
• Digital signature of the CA
Other fields that might be included are as follows:
• Certificate serial number
• Certificate expiration data
• Algorithms used to generate the signature
X.509 is a well-known standard that defines the basic PKI data formats like the certificate itself and the Certificate Revocation List (CRL) formats to enable basic interoperability.
The format defined by the X.509 standard is used extensively in today’s networks. It can be found in these locations:
• On secure web servers for website authentication with Secure Socket Layer (SSL)
• On web browsers for services that implement client certificates in the SSL and Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocols
• With user mail agents to support mail protection using the Secure Multipurpose Internet Mail Extension (S/MIME) protocol
• In IPsec VPNs, where certificates are used as a public key distribution mechanism for IKE RSA-based authentication
One problem with the manual key exchange process that was resolved by PKI was the issue of scalability. Another issue presented by the manual exchange process is the problem of key management. In the event that an entity’s private key is compromised, every other entity would need to be signaled to no longer trust that key.
A PKI can offer a simple solution to the key management problem in the form of Certificate Revocation Lists (CRL). CRLs contain a list of all certificates that are no longer valid. The CRL is signed by the CA and marked with a time stamp. It is stored on an HTTP server, a Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) server, or a Simple Certificate Enrollment Protocol (SCEP) server.
It is the responsibility of the PKI end user to obtain a fresh CRL after the old one has expired and to ensure that any of the certificates that it wants to use are not on the current CRL.
A certificate is placed on a CRL if it is no longer considered trusted. This can take place for the following reasons:
• Private key compromise
• Contract termination for a PKI user
• Loss of private keys because of memory loss
• Device replacement
A CRL can exist as a single list, which can become quite large, or be broken up into several smaller CRLs (multipart CRLs), accessible through different distribution points. The CRL Distribution Point (CDP) URL for a certificate is listed in the certificate itself.
The problem with CRLs is that they can contain stale information. They are issued periodically, usually every few hours, and therefore can contain out-of-date information. If a key is compromised in the middle of an update period, there is a window of time in which a compromised key can be used by an attacker.
The Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) provides real-time verification of certificates against a database of revoked certificates. When an entity receives a certificate from another user, the user queries the OCSP server in real time to verify whether the received certificate has been revoked. This eliminates the weakness of CRLs but requires a highly stable and highly available server from which users can obtain verifications.
A public key infrastructure (PKI) is a system in which every entity has its own public key signed by the trusted CA. This provides an efficient public key distribution model that supports large-scale public key-based technologies.
PKI provides entities with a scalable, secure mechanism for distributing, managing, and revoking encryption and identity information.
Keep in mind that a PKI is only a way to securely share public keys between users and other entities. The application for which a public key is used is completely different. Applications that use PKI include
• Email clients look up recipient certificates in a directory, and after verifying them, extract the public key and use it to encrypt mail to that person.
• VPN routers can exchange their certificates over an untrusted network. The public key inside a certificate is used to challenge the other peer to provide proof of the corresponding private key, and therefore authenticate it.
• Web servers that have certificates that are issued by well-known certificate authorities. Web clients have the CA certificates of those CAs and can verify the identity of a web server by obtaining the certificate at the beginning of an HTTPS session, verify it using the CA certificate, and extract its public key; the clients can then use this information to challenge the server to provide proof of its private key. This is typically done by sending the web server a random piece of data encrypted with the public key from the certificate and verifying that the server can decrypt it. This process essentially authenticates the server.
• In the same process as the web servers, the Cisco Unified Communications Manager authenticates to the IP phone and the IP phone to the Cisco Unified Communications Manager when configured to use TLS-protected signaling.
• A trusted public key from a certificate can be used to securely transport a symmetric (session) key of a symmetric algorithm to the other party.
A choice that you must make when deploying a PKI-based VPN is whether to use a dedicated, limited, VPN-only PKI that enrolls only VPN devices as its end users or to use a larger, enterprise PKI, where VPN devices are just one type of entity that shares the same PKI with other entities such as web servers, users, and other network devices. Table 16-2 depicts the comparison of these two options.

Table 16-2. VPN-Only PKI Compared with Enterprise PKI


The major steps for implementing a PKI-enabled IPsec site-to-site VPN are as follows:
Step 1: (Optional) Deploy the Cisco IOS Software Certificate Server if you are not using an existing PKI, such as an enterprise PKI or an outsourced PKI, for VPN authentication.
Step 2: Enroll all VPN devices into the PKI. This mandatory task requires the generation of RSA key pairs on all VPN devices, CA authentication (the secure installation of the CA certificate on each VPN device), and enrollment of each VPN device into the PKI (each device sends its name and public key to the CA and receives its identity certificate in return).
Step 3: Configure IKE to use PKI-enabled authentication and to use the local identity and CA certificates on each device. This is mandatory to obtain scalable authentication, particularly in a partial or full meshed VPN scenario.
Step 4: (Optional) Configure advanced PKI integration to perform more than basic revocation checks using CRLs.
The following input parameters are needed when building a PKI-enabled IPsec site-to-site VPN:
• Choose between a VPN-only PKI or an enterprise-wide PKI and then determine the parameters used to access that PKI.
• Local security requirements: This determines the choice of cryptographic algorithms (such as the hash functions when generating certificates), key lengths, and key lifetimes.
• Local naming standards: This determines the names that are used inside certificates of VPN devices. These can be X.509 distinguished names, fully qualified domain names, or both.
• Device-provisioning process: This process is used to set up new devices that will now need to include highly detailed procedures to prevent human error from jeopardizing the PKI.

When implementing a site-to-site VPN using PKI for peer authentication, consider the following deployment guidelines:
• Management procedures and organizational practices can reduce the trust levels that are introduced by implementing a PKI. Procedures for PKI enrollment, user registration, validating CA certificates, CA physical access and signing, and revocation need to be rigorous and strictly adhered to daily.
• Activities such as checking for certificate expiration and ensuring that CRLs are downloaded and kept up to date is very important. An accurate, trusted time source is required in VPNs for PKI implementations.
• Ensure that the provisioning of certificates is not the only activity that is considered critical. The entire certificate management lifecycle must be planned and managed properly. This includes key generation, enrollment, key/certificate renewal, revocation, and key destruction.
The Cisco IOS Software Certificate Server was introduced in Cisco IOS Software Release 12.3(4). The Certificate Server feature is supported on all platforms that run a security image. The supported hardware ranges from the Cisco 800 Series routers to the Cisco 7400 Series routers and also includes the Cisco ASR Series routers. The load experienced by running the Certificate Server is not typically a significant performance factor for IPsec network availability. Deploying the proper model of Cisco routers on which to run the Certificate Server function can greatly optimize performance and reliability. The Cisco IOS Software Certificate Server includes the following notable features:

• It provides a certificate authority function to devices that can enroll to it using SCEP or using a manual cut-and-paste enrollment process.
• It can act as a root or a subordinate certificate authority. This chapter will cover implementing the Cisco IOS Software Certificate Server as a standalone root server.
• It provides enhancements that can simplify the management of the certificate lifecycle such as supporting automatic reenrollment of clients to simplify certificate renewal.
• It includes a backup function to create a backup of Cisco IOS Software Certificate Server keys and auxiliary files.
• It provides support for redundancy, where the configuration and its functionality can be replicated to another Cisco IOS Software device. Full coverage of this redundancy feature is beyond the scope of this guide.

Several factors influence the selection of the appropriate router for the Certificate Server function:
• Key length: CPU utilization of a router can be pushed to a greater level for long periods of time because of the computational requirements of processing large RSA cryptography keys. This can cause an enrollment queue to grow when there is a long key pair in use and the router receives another Cisco IOS Software VPN router enrollment request.
• Concurrent enrollments: Large environments that could have constant and frequent certificate enrollments and reenrollments can suffer long wait times if low-performance routers are used as the Certificate Server.
• CRL location: The Cisco IOS Software Certificate Server stores its database on the local flash memory of the router. High-volume environments can suffer long queue lengths because of the fact that the individual data files must be written to the file system before the next certificate enrollment in the queue can be serviced.

Perform the following tasks to implement the Certificate Server on Cisco IOS Software:
Task 1: Create an RSA key pair to be used as the certificate authority key pair. The private key will be used to sign user certificates, and the public key will be distributed to all routers as the certificate authority self-signed certificate. Although this step is optional, a dedicated key pair will automatically be created of only minimally acceptable strength.
Task 2: Create a PKI trustpoint that designates the key pair that is intended to be used within the Certificate Server.
Task 3: Create the Certificate Server itself. A name for the CA is provided during this step.
Task 4: Configure the location of the CA’s files. This can either be on the router itself or on external storage on a remote server.
Task 5: Configure an issuing policy in which the administrator can either manually grant all certificate requests or the server can automatically issue certificates. An additional enrollment password can also be configured to authenticate enrolling entities.
Task 6: Configure the revocation policy in which the specific CRL parameters used by the Certificate Server are created.
Task 7: Configure the SCEP interface on the Certificate Server router.
Task 8: Enable the Certificate Server after all the parameters have been configured.
Prior to configuring a Cisco IOS CA server, you must conduct proper planning to determine the values that are needed to join the PKI (such as certificate lifetimes and CRL lifetimes). After some of the core settings have been configured and certificates have been granted, changing settings requires that the Certificate Server be reconfigured and the peers must reenroll.
The configuration tasks that follow will be performed with these considerations:
• A dedicated 2048-bit key pair will be generated to be used exclusively by the Certificate Server.
• The CA will be configured to use the local file system to store and publish its files. The /myca folder will be created and designated as the Certificate Server database location.
• The following certificate policy will be configured and enforced:
• The CA certificate lifetime will be set to 10 years.
• End-user identity certificates will be issued with a 2-year lifetime.
• Certificate Server will be set to manually grant identity certificate requests.
• The CA’s CRL will be published every 4 hours.
The first task creates a dedicated RSA key pair. The key pair will be assigned a name (label) and created with an appropriate key length. The exportable keyword is used to designate the key as exportable so that it can be backed up. Example 16-1 contains the commands for Task 1.

Example 16-1. Generate Dedicated RSA Key Pair
Router# crypto key generate rsa label CS-KEYS modulus 2048 exportable
The name for the keys will be: CS-KEYS
%The key modulus size is 2048 bits
%Generating 2048 bit RSA keys, keys will be exportable....[OK]
A PKI trustpoint is used mainly on PKI clients (VPN routers) to define the location of the CA.
Task 2 creates a named PKI trustpoint on the Certificate Server router, and inside it, references the label of the dedicated key pair that was created previously in Task 1. A PKI trustpoint is only used to define the key pair of the Certificate Server. If Task 1 was not completed, the CA server will autogenerate a 1024-bit RSA key pair after the CA configuration is completed. Example 16-2 shows the configuration to create the trustpoint.
Example 16-2. Create the PKI Trustpoint
Router(config)# crypto pki trustpoint MY-CS
Router(ca-trustpoint)# rsakeypair CS-KEYS
Task 3 and 4 create the Certificate Server, assign its name, and specify storage locations. Follow these steps and refer to Example 16-3 for guidance:
Step 1: Create a Certificate Server using the crypto pki server command, and assign the same name that was used in Task 2 to create the PKI trustpoint. This configures the Certificate Server to use the dedicated key pair.
Step 2: Within the Certificate Server, specify an X.500 name for the Certificate Server using the issuer-name command. Following the X.500 distinguished name format, use organizational standards to create a locally meaningful name. There must be at least one canonical name (CN) configured.
Step 3: Configure the location for the CA’s files using the database url command. The location can either be the local file system or an external storage location that is reachable over a trusted network path.
Step 4: Configure the database level using the database level command to specify how much information the CA will store in the database:
Minimum: Enough information is stored only to continue issuing new certificates without conflict. This is the default.
Names: In addition to the information stored at the minimum level, the serial number and subject name of each certificate can be stored as well.
Complete: In addition to minimum and names levels, each issued certificate is written to the database.
Do not store the entire issued identity certificate if NVRAM or Flash is used for the database as it may quickly run out of space.
Example 16-3. Create the Certificate Server and Configure the Database Location
Router(config)# crypto pki server MY-CS
Router(cs-server)# Issuer-name CN=MY-CS,OU=VPN,O=Cisco,C=US
Router(cs-server)# Database url flash:/my-cs
Router(cs-server)# Database level complete
Task 5 configures the certificate issuing policy on the CA. Follow these steps and refer to Example 16-4 for guidance:
Step 1: Specify the hash algorithm to be used in the certificate-signing process. By default, Cisco IOS Software Certificate Server uses Message Digest 5 (MD5) for the cryptographic hash function. Because it is not recommended to use MD5, change the hash function to use Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA-1).
Step 2: Configure the lifetime of issued certificates. After the lifetime expires, clients must reenroll to obtain new certificates. This is usually in the range of one year to several years.
Step 3: Configure the lifetime of the Cisco IOS Software Certificate Server signing (CA) certificate. After this lifetime expires, the CA will need to regenerate its self-signed certificate and possibly do so with new RSA keys. This will render all issued certificates invalid, forcing a reenrollment of all clients. This is usually done on the order of 5 to 20 years.
Step 4: Designate the grant method. By default, the Certificate Server uses manual granting, by which the administrator must grant each request. Automatic granting can be configured, optionally, with an additional password to authenticate certificate requests.
Example 16-4. Create the Issuing Policy
Router(config)# crypto pki server MY-CS
Router(cs-server)# hash sha1
Router(cs-server)# lifetime certificate 730
Router(cs-server)# lifetime ca-certificate 3650
Router(cs-server)# no grant auto
Task 6 configures the revocation policy. If SCEP, the default option, is used to distribute the CRL, there is nothing to configure. To tune the lifetime of the CRL, use the lifetime crl command inside the Certificate Server configuration. Example 16-5 shows the use of this command.
Example 16-5. Change Revocation Policy Lifetime
Router(config)# crypto pki server MY-CS
Router(cs-server)# lifetime crl 4
In Task 7, the SCEP interface is configured on the Certificate Server. This is essentially enabling the Cisco IOS Software HTTP server that provides the SCEP server to PKI clients. The CA will automatically enable and disable SCEP services based on the state of the HTTP server. If the HTTP server is not enabled, only manual Public Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #10 enrollment is supported on the Cisco IOS Software Certificate Server. To enable the HTTP server, enter the following command:
Router(config)# ip http server
After all the parameters have been configured and adjusted, Task 8 enables the Certificate Server. Use the no shutdown command in certificate server configuration mode to enable the Certificate Server. The command and resulting output are shown in Example 16-6.
Example 16-6. Enable the Certificate Server
Router(cs-server)# no shutdown
% Some server settings cannot be changed after CA certificate generation.
% Please enter a passphrase to protect the private key
% or type Return to exit
Password:
Re-enter password:
% Certificate Server enabled.
Router(cs-server)#
To make changes to the Certificate Server’s configuration, the server must be shut down first. Do not forget to reenable the server after completing the changes.
Limited management of the Certificate Server can be performed by using Cisco Configuration Professional:
• Cisco Configuration Professional can create a Certificate Server using a default configuration.
• There are no user-selectable parameters.
• There are no GUI configuration options.
• The server can be started and stopped.
• Backups can be created Cisco IOS Software Certificate Server keys and auxiliary files.
• There is an interface to administer certificate requests, issue certificates, and revoke certificates.
The show crypto pki server command can be used to verify the Cisco IOS CA server status. The output, among other information, will show the status as enabled or disabled and shows the CA certificate fingerprint.
Table 16-3 shows the required Cisco IOS Software releases and the functionality supported in them.
Table 16-3. Cisco IOS Software Certificate Server Feature Support


The Certificate Server supports CA certificate rollover to facilitate making key pair and certificate changes easier at expiration. This process happens in three stages:
• In stage one, there are only the active CA certificate and key pair.
• In stage two, the rollover certificate and key pair are generated and distributed. After the CA generates the rollover certificate and key pair and saves its configuration, it can respond to client requests for the rollover certificate and key pair. The CA responds with the rollover certificate and key pair to all new client requests. This causes the clients to store the rollover CA certificate and key pair.
• In stage three, the rollover CA certificate and key pair become the active CA certificate and key pair. All devices that have the valid rollover certificate rename the rollover certificate to the active certificate, and the previous active certificate and key pair are deleted.
For Cisco IOS Release 12.3(8)T or earlier, you can create your Certificate Server key pair as exportable. During the initial setup of the Certificate Server, the CA certificate and CA keys are automatically archived to facilitate restoring them if the original copy or original configuration is lost. With Cisco IOS Release 12.4(11)T and later, it is recommended that you store your CA server keys on a USB token if your router has a USB token configured and available.
The CA backup file is extremely important and should be securely stored. In addition to this backup, it is recommended that the serial file (.ser) and the CRL file (.crl) also be backed up. Both are critical to restoring the server if needed.
The Cisco IOS Software Certificate Server Redundancy feature allows two routers to become a redundant cluster. This feature depends on the Cisco IOS Software Stateful Switchover (SSO) protocol to provide the synchronization of the CA server state across two routers running HSRP.
This feature allows administrators to store the private key of the Cisco IOS Software Certificate Server on a supported USB Smart Token. This provides better protection of the key as compared to storage on the router file system.
This feature allows administrators to set storage locations and publish locations for specific server file types. This allows critical file types (such as the serial number files and the archive files [.p12 or .pem]) to be stored in one location and noncritical files, such as general certificates (.crt), to be stored either in the same location or in a different location.

The following guidelines should be considered when implementing the Cisco IOS Software Certificate Server to support VPN devices:
• Cisco IOS Software Certificate Server is a good choice of CA server and recommended as a CA to support VPN-only deployments.
• Establish good processes and procedures when granting certificates, and ensure the validity of requesting user and device identities.
• Consider using a remote server with fast, large, and reliable storage to hold the CA server files.
• Consider publishing the CRL on a highly available server so that it does not affect PKI authentication.
• The Cisco IOS Software Certificate Server can be used as a CA subordinate as a part of your enterprise PKI. This is beyond the scope of this guide.
In the event of problems with the Cisco IOS Software Certificate Server not initially starting, or not operating after a configuration change or environment change, follow these steps to troubleshoot the issue:
Step 1: Verify that the Certificate Server parameters have been configured to the appropriate values. Use the show crypto pki server and show logging buffer commands to search for potential errors.
Step 2: Verify that the time on the Certificate Server is set properly. Use the show clock or show ntp associations commands to determine the accuracy of the time.
Step 3: Verify the reachability and operation of remote storage if the CA is configured to use it. The inability to reach critical and noncritical files can affect the operations of the Cisco IOS Software Certificate Server.
Having synchronized time is vital for PKI, but PKI does not require that the time be extremely accurate.
Time synchronization issues can cause certificate validation failures if the current time on the VPN device is outside the validity range of the CA certificate.
To take advantage of PKI authentication for your VPNs, you must enroll your router into a PKI. In the following sections, the Cisco IOS Software provides the PKI client that will interact with the CA when authenticating for the VPN establishment.
Cisco IOS Software includes a PKI client that allows it to enroll into a PKI. The Cisco IOS Software PKI client supports SCEP or manual enrollment, can automatically enroll and reenroll to the PKI, supports several configuration options for certificate revocation and authorization checks, and can integrate with authentication protocols that need its services, such as the IKE protocol in IPsec VPNs.
This topic covers how to configure enrollment using the Cisco IOS Software PKI client. This is the process of adding a service to the PKI by authenticating to the CA and submitting the device’s name/public key to the CA to obtain a certificate.
Today, several protocols are in use for enrollment. Some of the common ones are as follows:
• File-based requests: The end user formats an enrollment request in the form of a Public Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #10 message in a file. The file is transferred to the CA, which signs the information and returns a PKCS #10 response file with an embedded certificate.
• Web-based requests: Used by web browsers and executed directly over the HTTP protocol.
• Simple Certificate Enrollment Protocol (SCEP): A lightweight, HTTP-based protocol for enrollment of network devices.
Enrollment for smart cards is another special method of note.
Note that none of these methods automatically solve the issue of operating over untrusted networks. Two-way authentication is always recommended for this reason.
Simple Certificate Enrollment Protocol (SCEP) is a lightweight enrollment protocol that is mainly used by Cisco. SCEP enables network devices to communicate with a PKI server (the CA). It has become an industry standard for enrollment of VPN devices and is supported by most leading vendors of VPN and PKI systems.
One of the most critical concerns with public key cryptography is the security of the private key. Private keys must be protected because if a private key were to become compromised, every entity that holds the public key that is associated with that private key must obtain a new public key and possibly obtain new certificates as well.

Cisco IOS Software provides support for three possible private key storage methods:
• Storing the private key in private NVRAM on the router, which is a special hidden segment on the device NVRAM. The file is stored in clear text but is not accessible using Cisco IOS Software file manipulation commands.
• Storing the private key in either private NVRAM or some other storage device such as an external USB key in an encrypted form. Cisco IOS Software will encrypt the private key using symmetric encryption, and the decryption key (password) must be provided before the key can be used. This makes this operationally challenging in many environments.
• Storing the private key in an external USB Smart Token. This provides the strongest protection because the private key cannot be copied from the Smart Tokens, and all cryptographic operations are performed on the token itself.

Perform the following tasks to configure the PKI client in Cisco IOS Software:
Task 1: This task involves creating an RSA key pair to be used for the identity certificate. The step is optional because if there is an existing RSA key pair on the router, it can be used. It is recommended that a dedicated RSA key pair be used for each identity certificate.
Task 2: On the enrolling router, create a PKI trustpoint to identify the CA. Creating the trustpoint also entails configuring the enrollment parameters, such as the enrollment method, the location of the CA (URL if SCEP is used), designating the RSA key pair, and configuring a list of device names.
Task 3: Authenticate the certificate authority by installing an authentic copy of the CA certificate on the enrollment device.
Task 4: Create an enrollment request on the enrolling router and submit it to the CA.
Task 5: On the CA, issue the router’s identity certificate and then install it on the enrolling router.
The enrollment procedure is the first task in the process of building trust between the CA and a user.
Figure 16-3 and the list that follows depict the scenario to be used in the upcoming configuration sequence.
Figure 16-3. Configuration Scenario

• The router (end host) will generate and use a dedicated RSA key pair for the identity certificate.
• The CA (pictured in Task 4) is at IP address 10.1.1.1 and will be accessed by the router using SCEP.
• The router’s subject name will be CN=R1, OU=VPN, O=Cisco, and C=US, and its FQDN is R1.vpn.cisco.com.
The first task involves creating a dedicated RSA key pair. The key pair is assigned a name (label) and created with an appropriate key length. Use the crypto key generate rsa command to generate a 2048-bit RSA key pair labeled VPN-KEYS. Example 16-7 demonstrates the use of the crypto key generate rsa command for Task 1.
Example 16-7. Generate a Dedicated RSA Key Pair
Router# crypto key generate rsa label VPN-KEYS modulus 2048 exportable
The name for the keys will be: VPN-KEYS
%The key modulus size is 2048 bits
%Generating 2048 bit RSA keys, keys will be exportable....[OK]
Task 2 creates the PKI trustpoint using the crypto pki trustpoint global configuration command. Now in trustpoint configuration mode, the entered details about the CA, enrollment parameters about the VPN router, and contents of the certificate will define the router’s identity. This is the point at which organizational security policy requirements need to be identified to ensure that the parameters used in the certificate are adequate.

Complete the following steps and refer to Example 16-8 to configure the PKI trustpoint:
Step 1: Create a named trustpoint with the crypto pki trustpoint command. Issuing this command also places the VPN router in trustpoint configuration mode.
Step 2: If the PKI uses SCEP for enrollment, specify the enrollment URL. If the CA is the Cisco IOS Software Certificate Server, use a URL with an IP address of the CA.
Step 3: (Optional) Specify a custom X.500 and/or FQDN that will be included in the identity certificate. If this step is skipped, the VPN router automatically uses its FQDN name (determined by the host name and domain name). The example shows both name formats being specified.
Step 4: (Optional) Specify the revocation check procedure for the CA. By default, Cisco IOS CA configures a mandatory CRL revocation check for a new trustpoint.
Step 5: Specify the RSA key pair to be used for enrollment using the rsakeypair command.
Example 16-8. Create a PKI Trustpoint
Router(config)# crypto pki trustpoint MY-CS
Router(ca-trustpoint)# enrollment url http://10.1.1.1:80
Router(ca-trustpoint)# fqdn router.vpn.domain.com
Router(ca-trustpoint)# subject-name CN=router,OU=VPN,O=Cisco,C=US
Router(ca-trustpoint)# revocation-check crl
Router(ca-trustpoint)# rsakeypair VPN-KEYS
Task 3 of the enrollment process is to authenticate the CA by obtaining its self-signed certificate. If SCEP is in use, the PKI client will perform this action in clear text over HTTP, so some security precaution must be taken.
The received CA certificate must be verified by comparing the fingerprint of the received information with either an administrator over the phone or by another secure method (encrypted email, for example). If the information matches, a valid, authenticated CA certificate was received.

Complete the following steps and refer to Example 16-9 to authenticate the CA:
Step 1: Enter configuration mode on the enrolling VPN router.
Step 2: Request the CA certificate from the enrollment URL over SCEP with the crypto pki authenticate trustpoint command.
Step 3: Verify the fingerprint of the received information against the known valid fingerprint that was received securely. The show crypto pki server command will show the fingerprint on a Cisco IOS Software Certificate Server.
Step 4: Answer yes if the information matches.
Example 16-9. Authenticate the PKI Certificate Authority
Router(config)# crypto pki authenticate VPN-PKI
Certificate has the following attributes:
Fingerprint MD5: 57684939 FE23980A 23498DB3 234DAF33
Fingerprint: SHA1: 18438EE9 923FED1C CC132ADB BBDE234A
% Do you accept this certificate? [yes/no]: yes
Trustpoint CA certificate accepted.
In Task 4, the crypto pki enroll global configuration command is used to submit the VPN router’s name and public key to the CA. The CA will sign the information and return an identity certificate to the VPN router. Using the no form of this command can be used to delete an enrollment request.
Complete the following steps to create an enrollment request:
Step 1: Enter configuration mode on the enrolling VPN router.
Step 2: Request the identity certificate from the enrollment URL over SCEP with the crypto pki enroll trustpoint command as demonstrated here:
Router(config)# crypto pki enroll MY-CS
Step 3: Optionally, enter a revocation password that might be required by the CA administrator to revoke this certificate in the future.
Step 4: The results display local device names configured as part of the trustpoint. Answer yes to send the request to the CA.
Failure to perform fingerprint validation steps could result in a potential attacker successfully executing a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack against a session and then replacing legitimate data with fake data. The attacker potentially could
• Substitute a fake certificate for the real CA certificate. This results in the VPN router trusting the attacker’s CA instead of the real CA.
• Substitute a fake public key for the real public key. This results in the CA issuing a certificate to the attacker instead of the legitimate VPN router.
Mitigating the possibility of interception and substitution requires two out-of-band authentication procedures:
• The PKI client (VPN router) must verify that it received the correct CA certificate.
• The CA must verify that it received the correct enrollment information from the PKI client.
The final task of the enrollment process involves having the information in the enrollment examined and then granting or rejecting the request if the Certificate Server is running in manually granting mode. Otherwise, the request will be automatically granted. The configuration sequence that follows is performed on a Cisco IOS Software Certificate Server.
Complete the following steps to grant or reject the client certificate:
Step 1: Examine pending requests by running the show pki server name requests command. All requests will be displayed. Each request will have a request identifier (ReqID), the fingerprint of the information submitted (to be compared to the locally calculated fingerprint), and the name of the requesting VPN router.
Step 2: Find the request being considered and validate its fingerprint against the client’s fingerprint.
Step 3: To grant the request when in manual granting mode, execute the crypto pki server name grant req-id command. To reject the request, use the crypto pki server name reject req-id command.
Upon granting the certificate, it will automatically be downloaded through SCEP by the PKI client and installed on the VPN router.
If an issued certificate must be revoked, use the crypto pki server name revoke serial-number command. Serial numbers can be seen if the CA is configured to use complete database level and the certificates are stored on the Certificate Server. Otherwise, there should be another administrative procedure that is tracking issued certificates by serial number.
The Cisco Configuration Professional can be used to enroll to a PKI on a Cisco VPN router. From the home page, choose Configure > Security > VPN Components > Public Key Infrastructure > Certificate Enrollment Wizards. When prompted, select the correct type of enrollment that is desired.
To verify that the CA certificate and identity certificate have been properly installed on the VPN router, use the show crypto pki certificates command. The output of this command shows the certificate availability and the time frames for which they are valid, as demonstrated in Example 16-10. If the identity certificate’s status is Pending, the VPN router has not received the certificate back from the certificate authority.
Example 16-10. Verify PKI Certificate Installation
Router# show crypto pki certificates
Certificate
Subject Name
Name: myrouter.example.com
IP Address: 10.0.0.1
Status: Available
Certificate Serial Number: 0123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF
Key Usage: General Purpose
CA Certificate
Status: Available
Certificate Serial Number: 3051DF7123BEE31B8341DFE4B3A338E5F
Key Usage: Not Set
Table 16-4 shows the required Cisco IOS Software releases and the functionality supported in them.
Table 16-4. Cisco IOS Software PKI Client Feature Support

The auto-enroll command can be used to have a VPN router automatically request a router identity certificate from the CA using parameters in the configuration. If an RSA key does not exist that matches the requested key label, this command will cause a new key pair to be generated. Adding the regenerate argument will cause a new key pair to be generated as well upon reenrollment. Note that some CAs require new keys for reenrollment to succeed.

Consider the following when implementing the Cisco IOS Software PKI client on VPN devices:
• With external CAs, get enrollment and revocation information ahead of time and test interoperability prior to production implementation.
• Test the process of CA authentication prior to production implementation.
• Ensure that private keys are protected appropriately. USB Smart Tokens provide one of the highest levels of protection.
• Auto-enrollment requires planning. Do not just plan the CA into automatic granting mode because this has security and risk implications as well as can affect production availability.

In the event of problems with the Cisco IOS Software PKI Client not enrolling, follow these steps to troubleshoot the issue:
Step 1: Verify the reachability between the PKI client and the CA server using standard connectivity testing methods. Also, ensure that the SCEP server is functioning by running the debug crypto pki transactions command.
Step 2: Verify that the time on the PKI client is set properly. Incorrect time can cause devices to reject certificates.
Cisco IOS Software–based routers can use PKI and certificates to authenticate peers when establishing VPNs. The following sections cover IKE peer authentication for use with VPNs on Cisco IOS routers.
Cisco IOS Software routers can use PKI and certificates for authentication of peers in an IPsec VPN. As an IPsec VPN is being negotiated between two devices, the peers will first authenticate each other using PKI certificates instead of pre-shared keys (passwords).

The PKI-based authentication for an IPsec VPN follows this process:
Step 1: The peers send their identity certificates to each other at the beginning of the IKE session.
Step 2: Each peer checks the CRL to validate the received identity certificate.
Step 3: The peers challenge each other to sign a random value with each peer’s private key.
Step 4: The peers then validate the signature by using the public key in the identity certificate.
By default, the IKE process on Cisco IOS Software routers will accept any valid certificate signed by any of its locally defined trustpoint CAs.
This can be risky for several reasons:
• Not all trustpoints can be VPN related.
• Not all VPN-related trustpoints contain only VPN routers.
• Not all VPN-related trustpoints can be the correct peer for a specific tunnel.
Certificates can be authorized to limit subjects that can be peered with.

To configure PKI-enabled IKE authentication for IPsec VPNs, perform some of or all the following configuration tasks, depending on which are required for the environment:
Task 1: Optionally, configure an IKE (ISAKMP) policy that uses PKI-based authentication of peers.
Task 2: Optionally, create an ISAKMP profile and bind it to a VPN association. This is used if there is more than one trustpoint and there is a requirement to bind a particular remote VPN peer to a particular trustpoint (CA certificate).
Task 3: Optionally, configure certificate-based authorization of remote peers so that they can only associate with particular VPNs. This is recommended in most scenarios.
The upcoming set of configuration tasks involves configuring a Cisco IOS router (R1) to establish an IKE session with another router using the following settings:
• The IKE session will be authenticated using RSA signatures.
• The IKE session will user 128-bit AES encryption and DH group 14 for key exchange.
• The R1 peer will be configured to accept the remote peer only if it can be authenticated using PKI-based credentials and based on its identity. Only peers whose name contains the OU=VPN, O=Cisco, and C=US x.500 identifiers can connect to the VPN.
Assumptions are that both peers are currently enrolled into a common PKI and that they both have the CA’s certificate. Additionally, the example assumes that both peers have a VTI-based IPsec configuration that will trigger the IKE process to obtain the necessary IPsec session keys.
Task 1 involves configuring the IKE policy that includes the RSA signatures (rsa-sig) authentication method. Example 16-11 shows the command usage.
Example 16-11. Create IKE Policy to Use RSA Signatures for Authentication
Router(config)# crypto isakmp policy 10
Router(config-isakmp)# authentication rsa-sig
Router(config-isakmp)# encr aes
Router(config-isakmp)# group 14

Task 2 configures the ISAKMP profile that specifies that a specific trustpoint only will be used to verify the remote peer’s identity certificate.
Complete the following steps and refer to Example 16-12 for the command usage:
Step 1: Create a named ISAKMP profile using the crypto isakmp profile name command.
Step 2: In ISAKMP profile configuration mode, set the local trustpoint that will be used to verify the peer’s certificate with the ca trust-point trustpoint_name command.
Step 3: Enter the IPsec profile configuration mode and apply the ISAKMP profile to the IPsec profile using the set isakmp-profile command.
Example 16-12. Configure an ISAKMP Profile
Router (config)# crypto isakmp profile MY-ISAKMP-PROFILE
Router (conf-isa-prof)# match certificate MYCERTMAP
Router (conf-isa-prof)# ca trust-point VPN-PKI
!
Router (config)# crypto ipsec profile MY-IPsec-PROFILE
Router (ipsec-profile)# set isakmp-profile MY-ISAKMP-PROFILE
!
Router (config)# interface Tunnel 0
Router (config-if)# tunnel protection ipsec profile MY-IPsec-PROFILE
Task 3 limits peers with which the VPN router will establish IKE and IPsec sessions by using certificate maps to describe the allowed authenticated peers based upon fields in their identity certificates.
Complete the following steps and refer to Example 16-13 for the command usage.
Step 1: Create a certificate map using the crypto pki certificate map command.
Step 2: In the certificate map entry, provide the conditions for accepting a remote peer based on the contents of the peer’s certificate. The example shows that the subject name must contain (co) appropriate OU, O, and C parameters in the X.500 name.
Step 3: In the ISAKMP profile, add a condition to map the peer’s certificate against the certificate map using the match certificate command.
Example 16-13. Using Certificate Maps to Limit Allowed VPN Peers
Router(config)# crypto pki certificate map MY-CERT-MAP 10
Router(ca-certificate-map)# subject-name co ou=VPN, o=Cisco, c=US
!
Router (config)# crypto isakmp profile MY-ISAKMP-PROFILE
Router (conf-isa-prof)# match certificate MY-CERT-MAP
Use the debug crypto isakmp command to look for the ISAKMP policy using rsa-sig for authentication, successful certificate authorization when a peer matches the profile, and the successful establishment of the IKE SA. Example 16-14 shows what the output of this command looks like.
Example 16-14. debug crypto isakmp Command Output
Router# debug crypto isakmp
20:26:58: ISAKMP (8): beginning Main Mode exchange
20:26:58: ISAKMP (8): processing SA payload. message ID = 0
20:26:58: ISAKMP (8): Checking ISAKMP transform 1 against priority 10 policy
20:26:58: ISAKMP: encryption DES-CBC
20:26:58: ISAKMP: hash SHA
20:26:58: ISAKMP: default group 1
20:26:58: ISAKMP: auth pre-share
20:26:58: ISAKMP (8): atts are acceptable. Next payload is 0
Table 16-5 shows the required Cisco IOS Software releases and the functionality supported in them.
Table 16-5. Cisco IOS Software IKE Peer Authentication Feature Support

Consider the following when implementing the Cisco IOS Software IKE peer authentication on Cisco VPN devices:
• Always use CRLs to access revocation information.
• It is highly recommended to authorize remote peer certificates when using non-VPN-only PKIs or with multiple trustpoints in the configuration.
• Consider using a general naming convention to include groups of valid routers as opposed to exact remote peer names because using specific names will not scale in meshed VPN environments.
In the event of problems with the Cisco IOS Software PKI Client not enrolling, follow these steps to troubleshoot the issue:
Step 1: Verify that the certificates shared by the peers have not been revoked and are still valid.
Step 2: Verify that the peers authenticate using certificates.
Step 3: Verify that the certificate-based authorization does not inhibit the creation of IKE SAs. If the IKE SA authenticates but fails to negotiate IPsec SAs, this could be a sign of failed authorization.
By default, Cisco IOS Software Certificate Server makes the CRL available using SCEP. Some instances might require that the CRL be published to an external server. In these cases, the Certificate Server can be configured to publish the CRL to a particular URL so that it will be available to clients. The CRL Distribution Point (CDP) URL inside the certificate can be used to provide the location to clients. Example 16-15 portrays a server exporting its CRL over FTP to a remote server using the database url crl publish command. It also includes a custom CDP URL using the cdp-url command that points to the CRL.
Example 16-15. Publish CRL to External Server
Router(config)# crypto pki server MY-CS
Router(cs-server)# database url crl publish ftp://crl.company.com username admin
password ****
Router(cs-server)# cdp-url http://crl.company.com/MY-CS.crl
By default, Cisco IOS Software PKI clients check the CRL for revocation information, and if the CRL is not reachable, all sessions will be rejected until the PKI client has a current CRL. This behavior can be modified so that PKI clients will accept peers even if the CRL is unavailable. A client can be configured to accept peers without CRL confirmation by using the revocation-check crl none command. Additionally, to request that the CRL be downloaded immediately, issue the crypto pki crl request name global configuration command. See Example 16-16 for the commands to allow this.
Example 16-16. Configuring CRL Handling on PKI Clients
Router (config)# crypto pki trustpoint VPN-PKI
Router(ca-trustpoint)# revocation-check crl none
Router(ca-trustpoint)# exit
Router(config)# crypto pki crl request MY-TRUSTPOINT
If using a CRL does not satisfy organization requirements for revocation, Cisco IOS Software Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) client or an AAA client can be used to satisfy real-time revocation operation. These technologies are not covered in this course.
As mentioned in the section, “How to Use This Book,” in the Introduction, you have several choices for exam preparation: the exercises here, the memory tables in Appendix C, the final exam preparation chapter, and the exam simulation questions on the CD-ROM. The following questions present a bigger challenge than the exam itself because they use an open-ended question format. By using this more difficult format, you exercise your memory better and prove your conceptual and factual knowledge of this chapter. You can find the answers to these questions in Appendix A, “Answers to the DIKTA Quizzes and Fill in the Blanks Questions.”
Review the most important topics in the chapter, noted with the Key Topics icon in the margin of the page. Table 16-6 lists a reference of these key topics and the page numbers on which each is found.


Print a copy of Appendix C, “Memory Tables” (found on the CD), or at least the section for this chapter, and complete the tables and lists from memory. Appendix D, “Memory Table Answers,” also on the CD, includes completed tables and lists to check your work. Although there are no memory tables in this chapter, you will find some memory tables for other chapters.
Define the following key terms from this chapter, and check your answers in the Glossary:
public key infrastructure (PKI)
Certificate Revocation List (CRL)
Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)
Simple Certificate Enrollment Protocol (SCEP)
man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack
Configuring and Managing a Cisco IOS Certificate Server for PKI Deployment, www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/ios/sec_secure_connectivity/configuration/guide/sec_cfg_mng_cert_serv.htm.
Configuring Authorization and Revocation of Certificates in a PKI, www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/ios/sec_secure_connectivity/configuration/guide/sec_cfg_auth_rev_cert.html.